Country Size and Labor Market Flexibility in the European Monetary Union: Why Small Countries Have more Flexible Labor Markets by Zemanek, Holger
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Country Size and Labor Market
Flexibility in the European Monetary
Union: Why Small Countries Have more
Flexible Labor Markets
Holger Zemanek
University of Leipzig
27. July 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16482/
MPRA Paper No. 16482, posted 2. August 2009 02:07 UTC
Country Size and Labor Market Flexibility in the European 
Monetary Union: Why Small Countries Have more Flexible 
Labor Markets* 
 
 
 
 
 
Holger Zemanek 
University of Leipzig 
Institute for Economic Policy 
(zemanek@wifa.uni-leipzig.de) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the impact of country size on labor market flexibility in a monetary union 
with a common monetary policy as conducted in EMU. I apply a Barro-Gordon framework 
and test its result empirically for EMU. Results confirm that small countries demand higher 
labor market flexibility than large countries. Small countries use labor market flexibility to be 
protected against monetary policy in favor of large countries and use flexibility as a substitute 
for monetary policy. Thereby, national inflation volatilities and unemployment volatility are 
important determinants. Business cycle synchronization reduces the need of small countries 
for additional labor market flexibility.  
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I. Introduction 
Globalization and the European integration and most recently the need to adjust to large intra-
euro area current account imbalances have built up pressure on European countries to adopt 
more flexible institutions, especially on labor markets (IMF 2007, European Commission 
2008, Zemanek et al 2009). However, small open countries of the European Monetary Union 
have on average more flexible labor markets if measured by the Heritage Labor Freedom 
index (Figure 1). This observation goes in line with empirical results of Duval and Elmeskov 
(2006) who find that small countries implement more structural reforms than large countries. 
One reason for higher labor market flexibility in small countries might be the common 
monetary policy framework in EMU as small countries have a smaller weight in monetary 
policy decisions than large countries. In this paper, I analyze whether such a “one-size” 
monetary policy results in the observed country size-specific labor market flexibility. As 
theoretical framework I use a Barro-Gordon model. I then test my theoretical results in an 
empirical analysis for the EMU. 
 
Figure 1: GDP and Labor Freedom in EMU
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Source: Eurostat and the Heritage Foundation. 
                                                 
1
 High values of the Labor Freedom Index indicate higher labor market freedom. Nominal GDP figures of 2009 
are taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook forecast. 
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Up to now, research on this issue remains relatively scarce. The seminal paper by Mundell 
(1961) on optimum currency areas has implicitly addressed the role of monetary policy for 
labor market flexibility. Mundell argued that in a monetary union (with symmetric country 
size), a country needs flexible labor markets to adjust to asymmetric shocks as exchange rates 
and monetary policy cannot work as automatic stabilizers. Bean (1998) confirms this 
hypothesis by arguing that in a monetary union, national governments lose control over 
monetary policy and therefore need to implement labor market flexibility to restore 
macroeconomic flexibility. The role of asymmetric country size in a monetary union can be 
explained by Kenen (1969) who argues that small countries with low industrial diversification 
are more vulnerable to asymmetric shocks. This implies that they are forced to be more 
flexible than large countries. This is even more the case if the central bank reacts only 
marginally to asymmetric real shocks in small countries due to the small weight in the 
monetary policy reaction function (Hefeker 2006).  
The theoretical analysis of labor market flexibility using a Barro-Gordon framework 
(Kydland/Prescott 1977, Barro/Gordon 1983a, 1983b) goes back to influential papers by 
Calmfors (2001), Berthold and Fehn (1998) and Sibert and Sutherland (2000). They all 
discuss labor market flexibility between autonomous and common monetary policy in the run 
up to EMU. Up to the present, little research has been done on the determinants of labor 
market flexibility within a monetary union. In this paper I want to close that gap by 
investigating the impact of country size on labor market flexibility in a monetary union, in 
particular in the EMU.  
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, I scrutinize the role of country size for 
labor market flexibility in a monetary union. In section 3, I introduce the baseline Barro-
Gordon framework and develop a monetary union model. At this point, country size is 
introduced as well as a monetary policy characteristic quite similar to the European Monetary 
Union. Section 4 analyzes the impact of country size in a monetary union on labor market 
flexibility and in section 5 I empirically test the theoretical results for the EMU. I summarize 
my results and give policy implications in section 6. 
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II. Country size and labor market flexibility in a monetary union 
The general need for macroeconomic flexibility in a monetary union arises from irreversible 
fixed nominal exchange rates and a common monetary policy. National economic policy 
cannot use monetary policy and exchange rates anymore to adjust to asymmetric 
macroeconomic shocks. The adjustment process depends on real price and wage changes 
between countries. This implies that prices and wages, and therefore also the labor markets 
need to be flexible (Mundell 1961).  
The necessary level of macroeconomic flexibility depends on factors as discussed by Bean 
(1998). First, Bean argues that more flexibility will be required if business cycles within the 
monetary union are less synchronized. Then the common monetary policy cannot work as a 
union-wide stabilizer for all countries and may be insufficient from a single country’s 
perspective. And second, if countries of a monetary union have different production 
structures, then the probability of asymmetric economic shocks increases. This argument is in 
line with Krugman (1993) who argues that in a monetary union regional specialization 
increases. As the probability of asymmetric shocks rises, member countries of a monetary 
union need more flexibility than countries outside.  
Anecdotic evidence (Figure 1) and empirical results of Duval and Elmeskov (2006) raise 
the question of the impact of country size on labor market flexibility within a monetary union. 
Kenen (1969) provides a first theory to this. He argues in his theory on optimum currency 
areas that small countries with a low-level of industrial diversification are more vulnerable to 
asymmetric shocks. To some extent, other industrial sectors can not compensate for sector 
specific asymmetric shocks. Therefore, the need for labor market flexibility in less diversified 
small countries within a currency union needs to be greater than in large countries. 
A further reason for higher labor market flexibility in small countries might be the one-size 
monetary policy as conducted in the EMU. This common monetary policy does not stabilize 
equally all EMU member countries against asymmetric shocks. The reason is the construction 
of the one-size monetary policy. The aim of the European Central Bank (ECB) is to provide 
price stability based on the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). This EMU-wide 
index itself is calculated from weighted national price indices of all member countries. 
Country weights depend on the member countries’ economic size in terms of private 
consumption (ECB 2004, Eurostat 2001) (see Table 1).  
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Table 1: Country Weights of EMU Member Countries in the HICP in 2009 (in per mill). 
Country Weight
Austria 30.2
Belgium 33.9
Cyprus 2.5
Finland 16.8
France 206.0
Germany 260.7
Greece 34.6
Ireland 15.6
Italy 185.0
Luxembourg 2.6
Malta 0.8
Netherlands 50.9
Portugal 22.0
Slovak Republic 6.8
Slovenia 3.7
Spain 127.9  
Source: Eurostat 2009. 
 
The computation of the HICP allows a single country’s national inflation to differ from the 
central bank’s target as a result of national wage and fiscal policies or country specific shocks. 
Crucially, however, it depends on the size of the country how the ECB will react to this 
development. For instance, the ECB’s monetary policy will only marginally reflect low 
inflation due to a recession in a small country, as weighted EMU-wide inflation will just 
marginally change. In contrast, a similar economic development in a large country will be 
echoed in the ECB’s monetary policy. Therefore, small countries of the EMU are forced to 
regain competitiveness and economic progress via high flexibility and structural reforms. In 
the case of large countries, the ECB will (partially) address a recession by interest rate cuts. 
Hence, small countries have ex-ante a larger incentive for high labor market flexibility. 
Contrary, Berger and Hefeker (2004) argue that country size does not necessarily affect 
labor market flexibility. They refer to the decision mechanism of the ECB. Directors and 
representatives of national central banks decide on monetary policy with equal voting power 
(one-country-one-vote). If national representatives act on behalf of their home countries then 
monetary policy decision might be biased. In an extreme case, small countries might form a 
coalition to overrule large countries. Nevertheless, this argumentation is less realistic and 
questions the credibility of ECB’s monetary policy. 
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III. The baseline two-country model 
To analyze the impact of country size on labor market flexibility, I use a model of time 
inconsistency in monetary policy based on Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and 
Gordon (1983a, 1983b), which is in line with previous literature (Berthold/Fehn 1998, 
Sibert/Sutherland 2000, Calmfors 2001, Belke/Herz/Vogel 2005).  
The original framework by Barro and Gordon refers to the monetary policy decision of the 
central bank by assuming a short-term Phillips-curve relationship between inflation and 
unemployment. If the inflation rate rises above expected inflation, then cost of labor will fall 
in real terms, this in turn reduces unemployment, as economic agents are not able to 
differentiate between nominal and real price increases. Therefore, the central bank can exploit 
the Philips-curve relationship to reduce unemployment at the cost of higher inflation.  
In addition to the original Barro-Gordon model, in the extended model (e.g. Calmfors 
2001) the national government decides on the optimum degree of labor market flexibility for 
the economy. The government might increase labor market flexibility because they reduce 
unemployment as labor market distortions are reduced. Further the country is more protected 
against unemployment volatility in the case of asymmetric shocks. Nevertheless, higher labor 
market flexibility is not free of costs. The government will face in particular political costs 
such as opposition from voters and insiders who stand to lose their benefits and rents from 
low labor market flexibility. General strikes, as have occurred in France on several occasions, 
or a change in government, as in Germany in 2005 are examples of such political costs. 
Hence, the government will balance costs of higher labor market flexibility against utility of 
lower unemployment.  
Within this extended framework, unemployment could therefore be reduced by surprise 
inflation of the central bank and/or by structural reforms of the government. The central bank 
decides on its optimum inflation and the government decides on the optimum labor market 
flexibility. As I model a one-size monetary policy as conducted in EMU, I assume a 
conservative central bank, which only aims for low and stable inflation. This central bank 
does not use surprise inflation to reduce unemployment. Only national governments adjust 
labor market flexibility to curb unemployment.  
 The monetary union in my model consists of two countries ( )2,1=i . A supranational 
central bank is responsible for a common monetary policy, which aims to provide a stable low 
inflation based on a weighted union-wide inflation rate. In analytic terms, the central bank 
- 7 - 
minimizes its loss function where losses occur from a deviation of the weighted union-wide 
inflation rate from the objective inflation rate. The central bank’s loss function consists of two 
separate national loss functions of both member countries weighted by relative country size 
similar to EMU monetary policy. Relative country size is expressed by the factor a  for 
country 1 and ( )a−1  for country 2. The country specific loss functions of the central bank 
(denoted by subscript CB) are defined as standard quadratic loss-functions:  
(1) ( ) ( )( )2,1, 1 CBCBCB LaLaL −+=   ( )1,0∈a    with 
(2) ( )211,
2
1
εpi +−= kLCB    and   ( )222,
2
1
εpi +−= kLCB  
Union wide inflation rate is expressed by pi . k  ( 0≥k ) indicates an objective inflation 
above zero like the ECB target of “…below but close to 2 %…” (ECB 2004: 51). Positive and 
negative deviations of inflation from the target increase the loss of the central bank. In 
addition, national inflation rates ipi  are allowed to deviate from union-wide inflation as 
possible in the euro area. For instance, different national economic developments, national 
asset market developments, or national wage and fiscal policies might result in asymmetric 
national inflation behavior. I model national inflation developments by national inflation 
shocks: iε  with [ ] ( ) 0var;0 >= iiE εε . These shocks are assumed to be exogenous and 
independent of unemployment.
2
 The national inflation rate becomes ii εpipi += . The loss 
function of the central bank therefore is: 
(3)  ( ) ( ) ( )2
22
2
11 2
1
1
2
1
εpiεpi +−−++−= kakaLCB  
Depending on country size, the central bank will react to asymmetric national inflation 
developments. Each country’s government independently decides on its optimum labor 
market flexibility. Their loss functions (denoted by subscript Gov) include inflation and 
unemployment u as equally weighted but also a proxy for labor market flexibility s. Factor γ  
weighs labor market flexibility in the loss function and indicates also the importance of 
political costs of labor market flexibility. 
(4) ( ) iiiGov sukL i γεpi +++−= 22 2
1
2
1
    )2,1( =i ; )1,0(∈s ; 0>γ  
                                                 
2
 I will later abolish this latter assumption. 
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The interrelationship between unemployment, inflation and labor market flexibility is 
defined in a Phillips-curve following Calmfors (2001). Additionally, I add inflation shocks to 
the inflation term. By doing so, I apply national Phillips-curves which include the respective 
national inflation rate ii εpipi += :  
(5) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) iieiiii sssuu µpiεpiθ −+−+−−−= 11~     ( )1,0∈s , ( )1,0ˆ ∈u  and ( )u~,0∈θ . 
  Calmfors (2001) assumes an economy with a fraction s  of unregulated sectors and a 
fraction ( )s−1  of regulated sectors. In unregulated sectors of the economy, wages are almost 
fully flexible. Real wages are renegotiated continuously based on inflation and exogenous 
shocks. In contrast, in regulated sectors wages are set by long-term agreements based on the 
expected inflation and expected value of exogenous shocks. Therefore, s  represents a 
measure of overall labor market flexibility of the economy. Calmfors assumes that the choice 
of labor market flexibility is linked to political costs. For high labor market flexibility, more 
or broader structural reforms are necessary but at higher political costs. Therefore, s  in 
equation 4 and 5 are equally used.   
The unemployment rate iu  depends first on equilibrium unemployment u
~ . Higher labor 
market flexibility reduces equilibrium unemployment weighted by factor θ  (first term). θ  
can only reach the value of u~ , which secures a non-negative unemployment rate, in the case 
of 1=s . Second, unemployment is affected by unexpected national inflation as result of an 
inflation shock ( ) 0≠−+ ei piεpi . If national inflation ipi  exceeds (is lower than) expected 
inflation epi  then unemployment will decline (increase). However, a highly flexible labor 
market lowers the sensitivity of unemployment on unexpected inflation (second term) as a 
larger part of the economy will renegotiate wage contracts. Third, unemployment might be 
changed by a country-specific asymmetric unemployment shock iµ , which is assumed to be 
an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) white noise shock, with: 
[ ] ( ) 0var;0 >= µµE . Again, labor market flexibility lowers the impact of asymmetric 
unemployment shocks on unemployment (third term) because wages can easily be adjusted to 
a shock. Summarizing, labor market flexibility increases the ability of an economy to absorb 
surprise inflation and asymmetric shocks via wage variation instead of employment variation.  
. 
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IV. Structural reforms and country size 
In this section, I solve the model to obtain the optimum labor market flexibility with respect 
to country size. First, I assume, that inflation shocks are uncorrelated between countries 
( ) 0,cov 21 =εε . In so doing, I can more precisely analyze determinants that affect optimum 
labor market flexibility. The model is solved by minimizing function (3) with respect to pi . 
This yields via the optimum monetary policy
3
 the expected inflation rate epi  and the optimum 
union wide inflation rate *pi . 
(6) ke =pi  
(7) ( ) 21* 1 εεpi aak −−−=  
The private sector in the monetary union expects a union-wide inflation rate equal to the 
central bank’s target because the central bank only controls inflation and inflation shocks are 
ex-ante expected to be zero. The central bank will choose an optimum inflation rate and 
monetary policy in response to national inflation developments. A positive national inflation 
shock (higher inflation) imposes an additional loss in the central bank’s loss function. Hence, 
optimum inflation will be lower to minimize the loss. That indicates a restrictive monetary 
policy. However, the impact of national inflation shocks on union wide equilibrium inflation 
depends on country size. A shock in a large country affects optimum union wide inflation 
relatively more.   
Governments will anticipate the central bank's monetary policy reaction and will select 
their optimum degree of labor market flexibility. For instance for country 1, the government’s 
loss function (4) is minimized with respect to 1s  subject to (5), (6), and (7). After calculating 
the expected value, it yields the expected marginal costs of labor market flexibility. I set the 
latter equal to zero (First Order Condition) and solve for 1s , which is the optimum labor 
market flexibility *1s  for country 1:  
(8)     
( )
( ) ( ) 22222*1
121
1
~
1
µεε σθσσ
θθγ
+++−
−+
−=
a
u
s   for )1,0(*1 ∈s  
Optimum labor market flexibility depends only on exogenous variables and is symmetric 
for country 2: 
                                                 
3
 See Annex for all equations. 
- 10 - 
(9) 
( )
( )( ) ( ) 22222*2
221
11
~
1
µεε σθσσ
θθγ
+++−−
−+
−=
a
u
s     for )1,0(*2 ∈s  
Equation (8) and (9) reveal that optimum labor market flexibility depends positively on 
unemployment variance 2
iµσ . The higher unemployment variation, the more flexibility will 
both countries need to cushion the shocks, as monetary policy does not react to 
unemployment shocks. Further, higher equilibrium unemployment uˆ  and a larger 
effectiveness of labor market flexibility to reduce equilibrium unemployment θ  will be 
answered by higher labor market flexibility. High costs of structural reforms γ  reduce 
optimum labor market flexibility as the utility of higher labor market flexibility is more likely 
offset by political costs of flexibility. Most important, country size a  is negatively related to 
labor market flexibility. Additionally, inflation variances of both countries will force 
governments to choose higher labor market flexibility.  
The impact of labor market flexibility is the result of two effects. First, if inflation variance 
of country 2 is higher than country 1, it will not be directly affected by a rising inflation in 
country 2. However, such an inflation shock influences the union-wide inflation rate and 
thereby the central bank’s loss-function. To maintain the objective inflation rate, the central 
bank will react with restrictive or expansive monetary policy. Then monetary policy will spill 
over to country 1. First, monetary policy acts like surprise inflation or deflation, which affects 
the unemployment of country 1 via the Phillips-curve relationship. Second, higher or lower 
inflation rather than objective inflation, constitutes a loss for the government of country 1. In 
fact, a negative inflation shock (lower inflation) in country 2 would lower unemployment in 
country 1 via expansive monetary policy. Conversely, a positive shock (higher inflation in 
country 2) would increase unemployment via restrictive monetary policy.  
Such spill-over effects can be reduced or eliminated if country 1 has highly flexible labor 
markets. Then, monetary policy in favor of country 2 will not affect unemployment as wages 
are continuously adjusted. Whether country 1 will choose high labor market flexibility (as it is 
not free of cost) however, depends on its size. If country 1 is small then negative monetary 
spill-over will be large as higher inflation in country 2 increases the union wide inflation rate 
relatively more strongly. Country 1 might then face high unemployment. Utility of high labor 
market flexibility will exceed costs of higher labor market flexibility. Therefore, a small 
country will desire a high degree of flexibility. In contrast, if country 1 is large then negative 
unemployment effects are less intense or only marginal. In the presence of reform costs, a 
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large country 1 will prefer lower flexibility to “save” political costs of high labor market 
flexibility.  
Second, if country 1 has higher inflation variance and inflation rises than country 1, it will 
be directly affected in two ways. First, national inflation is unequal to expected inflation 
( ei pipi ≠ ) and states therefore a loss for the government. Second, changed inflation will 
impact on unemployment via the Philips-curve if the labor market is inflexible. Surprise 
inflation will lower unemployment; unexpected low inflation will increase unemployment. 
However, the central bank will react on the inflation shock as union wide inflation rate is 
unequal to the objective rate. Monetary policy will compensate for national effects (inflation 
and unemployment). National and expected inflation rates converge again and unemployment 
is finally less changed. 
Nevertheless, the degree of monetary policy reaction and hence shock compensation 
depends on country size. A shock in a small country 1 will affect union wide inflation only 
marginally. Therefore, monetary reaction will also be small. Inflation difference and 
unemployment change as result of the shock will be almost uncompensated in a small country 
1. In contrast, effects of an inflation shock in a large country 1 will be almost completely 
compensated. Assuming inflexible labor markets, a small country 1 will end up with a 
relatively high loss of changed inflation. Changed unemployment can be a gain (in the case of 
surprise inflation) or a loss (in the case of lower inflation). A large country 1 has a relatively 
small loss from changed inflation and gains or loses marginally from changed unemployment. 
Therefore, a small country will choose high labor market flexibility as the central bank does 
not react to changed inflation which will always state a certain loss for the government 1.  
The small country will prefer higher labor market flexibility than the large country to 
avoiding monetary policy spill-over. It makes itself independent from spill-over of monetary 
policy in favor of country 2. Further, it substitutes lost flexibility of an autonomous monetary 
policy by labor market flexibility. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship for numerical examples.
 
4
 While the x-axis shows the relative country size, the y-axis is optimum labor market 
flexibility.  
 
 
                                                 
4
 I set equilibrium unemployment at 5 percent, gamma is set simply at one and theta at 0.05 to avoid non-
negative figures of equilibrium unemployment in the case of perfect labour market flexibility. A variation of 
values does not change the general relationship.  
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Figure 2: Country size and optimum labor market flexibility, uncorrelated inflation shocks. 
 
 
 
Correlation between inflation and unemployment 
As extension, I allow different shocks to correlate. First, I assume that inflation and 
unemployment shocks are correlated [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) 0var;0;0var;0 >=>= iiii EE µµεε ; 
( ) 0,cov ≠ii µε . In particular, I assume a negative correlation which is plausible in economic 
terms. In a recession higher unemployment and low inflation might occur, as additional 
unemployment might reduce consumption, wage growth and therefore price inflation. In 
contrast, low unemployment, rising wages and consumption are responsible for higher 
inflation during a boom. Therefore, I capture with this specification national business cycles. 
Again, I solve the model and obtain the optimum labor market flexibility that includes the 
covariances between inflation shocks and unemployment shocks 
11 ,µεσ  and 22 ,µεσ : 
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*
1
11121
121
~
1
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 (11) 
( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) 22,222
*
2
22221
11211
~
1
µµεεε σθσσσ
θθγ
++−−++−−
−+
−=
aa
u
s  
The assumed negative correlation between inflation and unemployment shocks increases 
labor market flexibility irrespective of country size. In case of a recession, lower than 
expected inflation, first, states a loss for the government. Second, inflation increases 
unemployment via the Phillips-curve relationship. Additionally, unemployment rises as a 
result of the unemployment shock. Although the central bank will partly compensate with 
expansive monetary policy, a country will end-up with higher unemployment – partly from 
lower inflation and directly from the unemployment shock. 
Especially, the large country will now prefer relative higher labor market flexibility, as the 
small country has already a high level flexibility. Figure 3 shows the relationship between 
relative country size and optimum labor market flexibility dependent on the correlation 
between unemployment and inflation shocks. ( )1,1, −∈ii µερ  is the correlation coefficient. 
Bold lines indicate 0, =ii µερ  and thin lines 1, −=ii µερ . 
 
Figure 3: Country size and optimum labor market flexibility, correlated inflation and 
unemployment shocks. 
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Correlation between national inflation rates 
In the last step, I remove the assumption of uncorrelated national inflation shocks 
[ ] ( ) ( ) 0,cov;0var;0 21 ≠>= εεεε iiE . By doing so, I account for asymmetric and symmetric 
inflation shocks which are related to business cycle synchronization within a monetary union. 
Inflation rates in both countries are probably higher in a boom than in a recession. Positive 
correlation of national inflation shocks therefore accounts for business cycle synchronization. 
If I solve the model again, I get the optimum labor market flexibility for country 1 and 2: 
(12)    
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 22,2,222
*
1
1211121
12121
~
1
µεεµεεε σθσσσσ
θθγ
++−−−++−
−+
−=
aaa
u
s  
(13)        
( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 22,2,222
*
2
2212221
1211211
~
1
µεεµεεε σθσσσσ
θθγ
++−−−−++−−
−+
−=
aaa
u
s  
In addition to equation (10) and (11), the covariance between two inflation shocks 
21 ,εε
σ  is 
a determinant for optimum labor market flexibility. A negative covariance reduces the second 
term of equation (12) and (13) which reduces optimum labor market flexibility. In contrast, 
positive values for the covariance increase optimum labor market flexibility. This result 
confirms Bean (1998).  
If inflation shocks are negatively correlated, inflation shocks in the small country will be 
accelerated by the monetary policy reaction in favor of the large country. For example, the 
small country has low inflation as a result of a recession. The optimal monetary policy 
reaction would be expansive monetary policy. However, as the large country has high 
inflation, the central bank will pursue a restrictive monetary policy. Inflation in the small 
country falls even more and unemployment rises. Hence, the small country needs additional 
labor market flexibility.  
In the case of positive correlated inflation shocks, which assume business cycle 
synchronization, monetary policy will always meet the need of the small country. Too low 
inflation will always be compensated by expansive monetary policy and vice versa. 
Therefore, business cycle synchronization lowers the need for additional labor market 
flexibility in the small country. The gap in labor market flexibility between the small and the 
large country is reduced.  
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Figure 4 shows the relationship between country size and optimum labor market flexibility 
for different correlation coefficients of national inflation shocks ( )1,1
21 ,
−∈εερ . Bold lines 
indicate 0
21 ,
=εερ , thin lines 121 , =εερ , and dashed lines 121 , −=εερ . 
 
Figure 4: Country size and optimum flexibility, correlated inflation shocks. 
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V. Empirical analysis 
In this section I test my theoretical results in an empirical analysis for the EMU. In particular, 
I test the impact of country size, national inflation volatility, unemployment volatility, 
inflation correlation, and correlation between national inflation and unemployment on labor 
market flexibility.  
 
Data and model specification 
I base my estimates on a bilateral data set for eleven EMU core countries
5
 over the period 
2004-2008. The bilateral data set reflects the two-country setting of my theoretical model and 
increases the number of observations to 550. 
I measure labor market flexibility (lmf) by the Labor Freedom index published by the 
Heritage Foundation (Heritage 2009). The index ranges from 0 to 100 with higher values 
indicating higher labor freedom. It includes legal and regulatory aspects of a country’s labor 
market framework, such as minimum wages, employment protection, and measurable 
regulatory burdens on hiring and working hours. Unfortunately, data on labor market 
flexibility are only available from 2005 to 2009. As the index is published at the beginning of 
a year, I link index values to macroeconomic values of the respective past year.     
 Country size (size) is first measured by nominal GDP, taken from the IMF World 
Economic Outlook Database. To account for my bilateral model setting, I calculate the 
relative country size of a country relative to another 








j
i
size
size
 with i  and j  identifying 
countries. Second, I use population figures from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database 
as proxy for country size, again measured in relative values, to check for robustness of my 
results. The inflation variance ( 2
iε
σ ) and inflation correlation (
ji εε
σ , ) are calculated from 
monthly national HICP inflation figures, provided by Eurostat. Similarly, unemployment 
variances are based on monthly seasonal adjusted unemployment figures by Eurostat.  
I use the following linear regression equation: 
 
 (13) εβσσβσσβσ µεεµεεε +++++++






+= Iβββ
size
size
ββlmf
ijiiiji
j
i
i 7
2
6,5,4
2
3
2
210 .  
                                                 
5
 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. I use these 
early entry countries only, as these countries have had several years to adjust their labor market flexibility to 
EMU conditions as assumed in my model. 
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I estimate relative country size, national inflation variances, correlation between inflation 
and unemployment, inflation correlation, and unemployment variance on labor market 
flexibility in a pooled OLS regression. Subscripts i and j indicate countries. ε  is the white 
noise error term.  
Additionally, by introducing an interaction term I, I test, whether the relationship between 
relative country size and labor market flexibility is influenced by national inflation rate 
volatilities (Jaccard/Turrisi 2003). Such interaction effects can be isolated by product terms of 
relative country size (focal variable) and the variance variable (moderator variable): 
( )( )2
iji
sizesize εσ  or ( )( )2jji sizesize εσ . Note, that the interpretation of regression coefficients 
changes. With an eye on my own estimations, the interpretation of regression coefficients can 
be summarized as follows (Jaccard/Turrisi 2003): 1β  captures the effect of relative country 
size on labor market flexibility if the inflation variance in country i (j) is zero, 2β  
( 3β )estimates the effect of inflation variance in country i (j) on labor market flexibility if 
country size is zero
6
, and 7β  indicates the number of units that 1β  increases/decreases if 
inflation variance in country i (j) grows by one unit.   
Taking my theoretical results, I would expect the following results. First, the coefficient of 
relative country size should be negative to confirm that country size is negatively related with 
labor market flexibility. Second, I expect both coefficients of national inflation variances to 
be positive. Third, correlation between unemployment and inflation should result in a 
negative coefficient as well as the coefficient for inflation correlation, as a high inflation 
correlation is associated with lower labor market flexibility. And fifth, the empirical results 
for unemployment variance would match theoretical one, if its coefficient becomes positive. 
The interaction term is expected to become negative. That would indicate, that a rising 
inflation variance in country i (j) increases the need for labor market flexibility in small 
countries – the negative effect of country size would be accelerated. 
I use a robust OLS estimator. As correlation between my independent variables is low, 
biasing effects of multicoliniarity are not expected.
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 This latter interpretation is not realistic and will therefore not used.  
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Estimation results 
Table 2 and 3 show regression results for estimation using GDP and population as proxy for 
country size. Notably, country size matters for labor market flexibility in the EMU. The 
coefficient for relative country size is negative and statistically significant in all 
specifications. Large countries of the EMU have on average lower labor market flexibility 
than small countries. This relationship is robust over all estimation specifications.  
In contrast to my theoretical results, the coefficient for inflation variance in country i is 
negative. However, the inflation variance of country j appears to be positive, but at low 
significance. Therefore, the need to be protected against spill-over against monetary policy in 
favor of the other country can be partly confirmed. The coefficient for correlation between 
unemployment and inflation is significant, but positive. The role of business cycle 
synchronization can not be confirmed as the coefficient for inflation correlation is 
insignificant. Nevertheless, unemployment variance shows the expected sign. Hence, higher 
unemployment volatility raises the demand for labor market flexibility. 
Results for interaction effects are displayed in table 4. Both interaction terms are positive. 
This confirms that rising inflation variance, irrespective of country, increases the need for 
labor market flexibility in small countries. However, the effect is especially evident for 
inflation variance in country i, as the interaction term for inflation variance in country j fails 
the common level of statistic significance. 
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Table 2: Regression results of pooled OLS estimations using GDP as proxy for relative 
country size. 
dependent variable: labor market flexibility of country i (lmf i )
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6
relative country size (GDP) -0.649*** -0.659*** -0.638*** -0.682*** -0.680*** -0.682***
(size i /size j ) (0.123) (0.125) (0.123) (0.125) (0.125) (0.124)
inflation variance i -6.262*** -7.934*** -7.297*** -6.995*** -9.679***
var( ε i ) (1.896) (2.218) (2.131) (2.220) (3.218)
inflation variance j -0.805 3.264 4.538* 4.850* 5.244**
var( ε j ) (2.097) (2.465) (2.585) (2.696) (2.703)
correlation between unemployment and 2.973*** 3.004*** 3.258***
inflation corr( ε i , µ i ) (0.990) (0.992) (0.994)
correlation of inflation rates -0.752 -0.540
corr( ε i , ε j ) (1.670) (1.681)
unemployment variance i 2.231*
var( µ i ) (1.260)
constant 62.8*** 61.4*** 62.4*** 62.2*** 62.5*** 62.6***
(0.800) (0.856) (0.867) (0.845) (0.975) (0.976)
obersvations 550 550 550 550 550 550
R-square 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance of 10%, 5% and 1%.   
 
Table 3: Regression results of pooled OLS estimations using population as proxy for relative 
country size. 
dependent variable: labor market flexibility of country i (lmf i )
#7 #8 #9 #10 #11 #12
relative country size (population) -0.645*** -0.666*** -0.628*** -0.662*** -0.660*** -0.664***
(size i /size j ) (0.120) (0.122) (0.120) (0.121) (0.122) (0.122)
inflation variance i -6.062*** -7.466*** -6.820*** -6.574*** -9.309***
var( ε i ) (1.889) (2.215) (2.129) (2.220) (3.194)
inflation variance j -1.129 2.727 3.956 4.216 4.612*
var( ε j ) (0.209) (2.461) (2.577) (2.689) (2.695)
correlation between unemployment and 2.918*** 2.943*** 3.203***
inflation corr( ε i , µ i ) (0.987) (0.989) (0.992)
correlation of inflation rates -0.620 -0.401
corr( ε i , ε j ) (1.671) (1.681)
unemployment variance i 2.276*
var( µ i ) (1.252)
constant 62.8*** 61.6*** 62.4*** 62.3*** 62.5*** 62.6***
(0.776) (0.847) (0.853) (0.832) (0.959) (0.960)
obersvations 550 550 550 550 550 550
R-square 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance of 10%, 5% and 1%.   
- 20 - 
Table 4: Regression results of pooled OLS estimations with interaction terms.. 
dependent variable: labor market flexibility of country i (lmf i )
#13 #14 #15 #16
relative country size (GDP) -0.114 -0.448** -0.133 -0.506***
(size i /size j ) (0.199) (0.184) (0.201) (0.185)
inflation variance i -2.598 -7.692*** -4.671 -9.432***
var( ε i ) (2.818) (2.211) (3.412) (3.186)
inflation variance j 3.113 4.802 5.033* 6.647**
var( ε j ) (2.425) (3.039) (2.635) (3.210)
correlation between unemployment and 3.237*** 3.241***
inflation corr( ε i , µ i ) (1.000) (0.996)
correlation of inflation rates -0.261 -0.511
corr( ε i , ε j ) (1.641) (1.676)
unemployment variance i 2.634** 2.200*
var( µ i ) (1.264) (1.239)
interaction term 1 -2.104*** -2.209***
(size i /size j )*var(εi) (0.537) (0.590)
interaction term 2 -0.835 -0.775
(size i /size j )*var(εj) (0.546) (0.577)
constant 61.1*** 61.9*** 61.3*** 62.2***
(0.982) (0.971) (0.590) (1.060)
obersvations 550 550 550 550
R-square 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.08
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance of 10%, 5% and 1%.   
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VI. Conclusion and economic policy implications 
The aim of this paper was to analyze why small countries in the EMU have on average higher 
labor market flexibility than large countries. The common monetary policy as conducted by 
the ECB provides an explanation for different levels of labor market flexibility in EMU 
member countries as small countries are less considered in such a particular monetary policy.  
I show within my extended Barro-Gordon framework for a two-country monetary union 
and in an empirical analysis for the EMU that labor market flexibility depends negatively on 
country size. The main reason for this is volatile national inflation rates in the monetary union 
which are differently considered in the monetary policy. Therefore, small countries need more 
flexible labor markets to be protected against monetary policy in favor of large countries and 
to substitute lost autonomous monetary policy by labor market flexibility. My theoretical 
results further suggest that business cycle synchronization within a monetary union reduces 
the gap in labor market flexibility between small and large countries, as monetary policy fits, 
at least partly, for small and large countries. However, I cannot confirm this result 
empirically.  
My results therefore call for that national economic policy should avoid strong national 
inflation movements within the EMU. This incorporates especially national fiscal policy, for 
instance taxation, fiscal stimulus as in the current crisis, and public sector wages. For large 
countries it would be useful to lower reform costs to increase the overall level of labor market 
flexibility in the euro area. This could be achieved for instance with a better communication 
of the need and benefits of labor market reforms for economic growth, employment, and 
income. Especially in the light of the intra-euro area current account imbalances and the 
current financial and economic crisis (Zemanek et al 2009), higher flexibility in all euro area 
countries would help to readjust imbalances and to cure the aftermath of the crisis. Persistent 
differences in labor market flexibility might additionally destabilize the EMU as economic 
shocks will hit countries differently and monetary policy could not provide proper adjustment 
for all countries.  
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Annex: Deriving of Equations 
 
 Loss function of the central bank:  
(A1) ( ) ( ) ( )2221
2
1
1
2
1
εpiεpi +−−++−= kakaLCB   
Deriving of optimum monetary policy by minimizing (A1):  
(A2) 0221 =−+++−= εεεpiδpi
δ
aak
LCB      
Union wide inflation rate, depended on optimum monetary policy: 
(A3) 221 εεεpi aak +−−=        
Expected inflation rate: 
(A4) [ ] kE =pi  because of: [ ] 0=iE ε      
Loss function of the government 1: 
(A5) ( ) 12121
2
1
2
1
1
sukLGov γεpi ++−+=       
Phillips curve of country 1: 
(A6) ( )( ) ( ) 111211 11~ µpiεpiθ sssuu e −+−+−−−=     
Loss function of government 1 taking in account A3, A4 and A6: 
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Ex-ante minimization of the government 1’s loss function: 
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Ex-ante optimum labour market flexibility for country 1:  
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First derivation of *1s with respect to a: 
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